组会主题：Fair Share,Social Efficiency and Endowment Inequality in a Principal-Agent Problem
We consider the class of contribution games, that has been widely studied in the experimental economics literature, in the context of a simple principal-agent problem. In this setting the contributions of agents produce an output for the principal who rewards the agents by granting them a share of the output (β). The objective is to find a mechanism that encourages all agents to make full contributions at minimum β. While a recent work shows that the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) can achieve this objective in both theoretical and experimental settings, in this paper, we generalize the GM by relaxing the assumption that players have equal endowments. Our preliminary findings show that, under the proportional allocation behaviour, for a relatively low β, there exists a SPNE with full contributions by all players and that the equilibrium is independent of the endowment inequality parameter. Moreover, allocation behaviour that concentrates too much on rewarding the highest contributor (e.g. a `winner-takes-all' allocation) may not support a full contribution equilibrium.
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