讲座时间：2021年12月15日15:00
讲座地点：文化中心305会议室
主讲人：上海财经大学 杜宁华教授
摘要：
We experimentally test the effectiveness of information design in a moral hazard framework based on Ely & Szydlowski (2019). The agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty and difficult tasks require higher efforts to complete. The principal is aware of the task difficulty and the principal’s objective is to induce the agent to work as much as possible whereas the agent trades off the reward from completing the task and the cost of effort. Theory predicts thatImmediate Disclosureof task difficulty incentivizes the agent to work only on easy tasks, whileDelayed Disclosureencourages the agent commence working and continue exerting efforts even when the task is difficult. Our experimental evidence confirms thatDelayed DisclosureoutperformsImmediate Disclosurein leading agents on. Critically, however, this is only true when the information scheme ofDelayed Disclosureis given by the experimenter, not chosen by the principal.
主讲人简介：
杜宁华，上海财经大学经济学院教授，经济系系主任。2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位，主攻实验经济学。亚利桑那大学的经济科学实验室是北美最早成立的实验经济学研究基地，由2002年诺贝尔奖得主Vernon Smith创建。杜宁华近年来致力于运用实验经济学的实证方法考察行为机制设计的基本问题， 对市场机制进行深层次的探讨。其研究成果发表在管理学顶级国际刊物Management Science，包括Games and Economic Behavior，European Economic Review在内的经济学国际一流刊物上，以及Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Decision Support Systems等著名经济学和管理学国际期刊上。
