报告时间：2024年12月31日（周二）下午13：30-16：00
报告地点：文化中心305会议室
主讲人：蒂尔堡大学 杨洁蕊
主持人：浙江财经大学 叶航教授
Abstract:
I study how to design incentive structures in asymmetric coordination gamesto enhance coordination success. Players decide whether to invest in a project. Thecost of investment varies across players. The project succeeds and generates jointbenefits only if the number of investors exceeds a certain threshold. Adopting a’global game’approach, I find that there is a unique allocation of the benefits thatoptimally incentivizes players to invest. Specifically, it finds the balance betweenproportionality and equality:players with higher investment costs receive a largershare of the benefits, but the disparity in the optimal benefits is smaller than thedisparity in costs. Lab experiments were conducted with three treatments variedin the benefit allocation. The benefits were allocated either proportional to the cost,equally, or between the proportional and equal allocations. The results support thetheoretical predictions and also reveal that a relevant justification for the asymmetryin costs is the prerequisite to apply the theoretical prediction.
主讲人介绍：
杨洁蕊，德国波恩大学经济学硕士，荷兰蒂尔堡大学经济学博士生。曾参与组织过两次学术会议，包括TIBER Symposium2021,2023。多次在国际学术会议上作报告，包括2024Summer School by the European Economic Review, 2024Summer School & Workshop onExperimetrics & Behavioral Economics, 2023 Economic Science Association World Meeting, 2022Economic Science AssociationEuropeanMeeting等。研究领域为博弈论，行为实验经济学。研究主题包括合作博弈，机制设计，互惠机制，心理学博弈等。
